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Abstract
The root cause behind the Chinese economy’s slowing down in 2012 lies in a
“one-size-fits-all” approach to macroeconomic management. This approach must
be abandoned if domestic demand is to be effectively boosted. A superior
approach would involve the introduction of policies tailored to the specific needs
of the economy. It would call for some combination of fiscal and tax measures to
stimulate investments, to enhance the profitability of non-Internet-based economic
sectors, to ease lending restrictions, and to increase the growth rate of the money
supply. There is little risk of inflation in China in the short term, but deflation is a
real threat.
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Review
China is facing unprecedented challenges to both its economy and its macroeconomic
policies. In July 2012, the Chinese CPI dropped to 1.8 %, and PPI has declined for
5 months consecutively. There are no signs of a meaningful recovery to demand for
electricity, and exports have grown by a mere 1 %. The added value of large industrial
enterprises increased by only 9.2 %. The total value of new loans is only RMB 540.1
billion, the lowest since October 2011. It is particularly worrying that aggregate fiscal
income has grown by only 8.2 %, 1.6 percentage points lower than in the previous
month, and that the growth rate of tax revenue is down 7.5 percentage points over the
previous month. These numbers paint an ugly macroeconomic picture of China, and
they inevitably give rise to questions about what is going on—and wrong—with the
Chinese economy. The most pressing question to answer is: should we attribute our
current predicament to macroeconomic cycles, structural factors, or policy failure?
I have always believed that the key to macroeconomic analysis lies in distinguishing
between short- and long-term factors. Solutions to short-term problems require policy
instruments, while long-term solutions require structural adjustment, in addition to in-
creased reform and opening up. We must remember that short-term problems are just
the temporary manifestations of longer term problems. Thinking in this way will help
ensure that we reach the right conclusions about the road forward.
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This has not, however, been the mainstream opinion on economic matters in recent
times. The going philosophies are typically based on a conflation of shorter and long-
term problems. Those who think this way are quick to attribute China’s economic diffi-
culties to factors ranging from the defects of the government-dominated economy, to
monopolistic state-owned-enterprises, to the need for more reform and opening up.
Some go so far as to prescribe constitutionalism, limited government, and economic
liberalization for treating what has been ailing China’s economy. I beg to differ. Years
of researching economic policies have taught me that macroeconomic problems are
mostly short term, and that macroeconomic policies are aimed at solving short-term
problems. They have, as such, two basic properties: they possess short time horizons,
and they are fine-tuning instruments. Fine-tuning essentially tweaks the economy in
the opposite direction of its current course of development or what is called a “discre-
tionary decision” in technical parlance. Discretionary decisions can be understood by
“Friedman’s k-percent rule,” attributed to economist Milton Friedman, who proposed it
in his disagreements with the post-Keynesian school in 1970s. According to Friedman’s
rule, so long as the rate of increase of the money supply is kept two points above the
annual economic growth rate, regardless of macroeconomic conditions, everything will
be fine, no matter where the chips fall. However, it is well known that Paul Volcker, a
committed monetarist who preceded Alan Greenspan as the chairman of the Federal
Reserve, ditched the Friedman Rule after just 6 months. Why? It is because macroeco-
nomic conditions fluctuate so much that no single rule can apply to every situation.
That is the reason that monetary policies in the USA have all been discretionary for the
past three decades. No other ideology was ever even considered, and so it was in China
as well. On our side of the Pacific, the situation is very similar, as it should be in any
market economy. In China’s specific case, the problem we are now experiencing is cool-
ing down, and so the goal of fine-tuning at this point is to use policies to heat things
up. It is just that simple.
The shrinking of overseas demand is largely due to the debt crisis in Europe and
weak economic recovery in the USA, both of which are quite beyond Chinese control.
Even though it may seem as though weak domestic demand is caused by restrictions
on the housing industry and squeezes on demand for local financing, the real culprit is
defective policies. Some have suggested that China’s current economic woes are partly
attributable to mid- and long-term factors such as tight profit margins and excess cap-
acity within non-banking sectors. While this is true, knowing this fact sheds no light on
how to choose the best macroeconomic policy responses. As was noted above, a basic
requirement of short-term policies is that they distinguish between short-term and
long-term economic factors. We can, therefore, try to understand the feasibility of pol-
icy fine-tuning by focusing on two short-term factors: the regulation of the real estate
industry and the squeeze on demand for local financing.
Although the “one-size-fits-all” approach to short-term macroeconomic policies is
defective, it has nevertheless persisted for years. In the regulation of the real estate
industry, for example, measures meant to help curb escalating housing prices in
first-tier cities were uniformly applied in cities of all different sizes, including many
second- and third-tier cities. But many of these cities not only did not need these
measures, but in fact they could ill afford them. The imposition of sweeping policies
on them is comparable to medicating an entire family when only one member is ill.
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All local governments in China want to see housing prices rise, because they earn
their keep mostly through land leases. Thus, the “one-size-fits-all” approach has ef-
fectively deprived many of them of their main source of revenue and is to blame for
the fiscal difficulties they have suffered in recent years. To exacerbate the problem,
shrinking treasuries undermine the efforts by many local governments to mitigate
the negative impact of regulations on the real estate industry. The government in
Beijing has included the construction of 36 million units of affordable housing in the
12th 5-year economic plan. These building projects are supposed not only to help
low-income households meet their housing needs but also to help more than 30
housing-related sectors by boosting demand for their products. This would have
been a perfect plan, except for the for the fact that reduced revenue streams have left
these projects unaffordable for many local governments, as the progress report of
the construction of affordable housing in the last year and a half demonstrates. In
other cities that answered the central government’s call to build affordable housing,
officials have experienced difficulties in selling the units and recovering investments.
The experience of one second-tier city in North-eastern China illustrates this point.
Because of the prohibitively high costs of building affordable housing in the down-
town area (which would also involve wide-scale demolition of existing structures),
the city government had no choice but to have them built far from downtown. But
the intended beneficiaries of these buildings are the very ones who can hardly afford
the transportation costs living far from the city center would entail, and so many of
them have chosen to opt out of moving into the very houses that were intended to
improve their living conditions. Furthermore, eligibility requirements for affordable
housing entitlements often set the income threshold too low, thus arbitrarily de-
pressing demand. The “one-size-fits-all” approach to policy intervention seems to be
a contributing factor to all these problems.
Nothing illustrates the effects of this approach more perfectly than the restrictions
that have been imposed on corporate financing beginning in 2010. In 2009, China’s
central government committed RMB 4 trillion to stimulate the economy in response to
the global financial crisis. Much of this money was intended to go to projects funded
by government-backed financing agencies. Local governments across the nation became
swept up in the short-lived stimulus frenzy. However, this “Great Leap Forward” style
economic stimulus likely runs afoul of the natural course of the economy, and the
poorest performers among these financing agencies ended up becoming the last to gen-
erate bad loans. That said, nearly one third of the nearly 8000 government-backed fi-
nancing agencies perform quite well and are able to maintain cash flows. But even they
suddenly found themselves in deep trouble after restrictive measures were introduced
in 2010. This further corroborates the charge that the “one-size-fits-all” approach to
macroeconomic policy intervention deviates from the basic laws of a market economy.
Now that the economy is cooling, it is high time to make necessary adjustments to the
policies governing these agencies and to put the best of them to good use boosting
domestic demand. Relaxing the regulations to which they are subject may help deliver
China from its current economic difficulties. Right now, China’s central government
should make clear a number of things. First, local governments should be given
greater latitude in exercising the right to make loans. Second, the five largest banks in
China—Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agriculture Bank of China, Bank
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of China, China Construction Bank, and Bank of Communications—should offer sup-
port to these companies. Third, the People’s Bank of China should stop using interest
rate adjustments, or “punitive” (“differential”) reserve ratio requirement hikes, at its
branches as a policy instrument for curbing lending increases at the local level.
As banks possess most of the money in China, loosening lending restrictions would
be a ready solution to many problems. We can analyze the potential for lending risks
and bad loans from two perspectives. On one hand, most Chinese banks are now run
as for-profit businesses and as such have an inherent interest in controlling risks, such
that they would be unlikely to support local development without reservation even dur-
ing times of credit growth. On the other hand, some defaults happen precisely because
tight restrictions on the lending scale leave some companies and government-backed
financing agencies (specifically those which might have survived with greater access to
sufficient funds) financially vulnerable and the incidence of bad loans higher. In this
sense, banks would essentially be operating to save themselves by helping to save local
enterprises in general, government-backed financing agencies in particular, and the
local economies by extension.
China is currently undergoing a state and party leadership transition. As such, the
government’s recent actions can be partially explained by the political cycle. The ad-
ministration under Premier Wen Jiabao has accomplished many good goals during its
two terms, and it should not leave for the next government to do what it can finish
itself. In particular, it should try to take aggressive actions to turn the economy around.
For example, many have already realized the limitations to the “one-size-fits-all” ap-
proach to macroeconomic fine-tuning policies in the realm of real estate restrictions.
We should not wait any longer to transition from universal application of uniform
lending restrictions across the board toward a narrower application of such restric-
tions to first-tier cities only, while exempting second-tier, third-tier, and smaller cities.
At the same time, the government should increase investment in affordable housing,
in part by introducing new taxes targeting real estate development. Officials should
expedite progress in property tax pilot programs to restore positive feedback loops in
the housing market, which would in turn help increase government income from land
leases at the local level. When the government has more money at its disposal, there
should be renewed confidence in banks. These developments are also good news for
the several dozen other sectors that depend on the real estate industry. Indeed, relax-
ing restrictions on the real estate industry and on government-backed financing will
benefit the overall economy, which may yet prevent from cooling further in the fourth
quarter of 2012.
Macroeconomic management is both a science and an art. The difficult part for the
government is correctly diagnosing the problems ailing the economy, prescribing the
right medicine, and having the political will to take the medicine before it is too late.
When we look at other countries, we must realize that conditions in China could not
be more conducive towards effective macroeconomic management. First, both the
private sector and consumers have money to spend. Second, local governments in
China are motivated to grow local economies and are more or less compliant. Third,
the dual structure of the economy means there is ample space for continued eco-
nomic growth. Fourth, institutional reform will free up more space still for economic
development. Fifth, there are many tools in the central government’s bag for dealing
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with economic difficulties. Sixth, China holds foreign reserves valued at USD 3 tril-
lion, which may be tapped in case of an emergency. The list goes on. The so-called
challenging situation facing the Chinese government really boils down to a question
of proper diagnosis and correct prescription.
Adopting appropriate fiscal stimulus policies
Stimulating domestic consumption should be a long-term rather than a short-term pol-
icy. This is because consumers’ demand (among both rural and urban populations),
which accounts for most of domestic consumption, cannot increase more than dispos-
able income does. Other factors beside disposable income also affect consumer spend-
ing, for example, consumer expectations and social context. Therefore, boosting
consumer demand does not fall within the purview of short-term stimulus policies.
Now that overseas demand for Chinese products is weakening, the only ways to quickly
relieve the economy are increasing investments and adding more government projects.
International factors aside, three domestic factors contributed to our current economic
difficulties. The first was tight restrictions in recent years on the real estate industry,
which have dealt a harsh blow to output and sales for the 30-plus sectors that are
closely linked to the real estate industry. The second was tight restrictions on
government-backed financing agencies that were introduced in 2010, following a bar-
rage of aggressive spending in 2009. The third was the postponement and/or stop-
page of many large central government-funded infrastructure projects, including
construction on railroads, highways, and airports. For the moment, it seems that
restrictions on the housing industry will likely stay in place for some time, but it may
be possible to relax restrictions on government-backed financing, and for infrastruc-
ture projects that have been put on hold to be resumed. Those in China who disagree
are usually concerned with local governments’ debt capacity and the prospects for
cost recovery from transportation and other infrastructure projects. But these fears
are misplaced. On one hand, when government-backed financing agencies with high-
grade capital are used, both liquidity and debt-repayment capability are more or less
assured. On the other hand, it is unwise to jump to hasty conclusions regarding the
cost-effectiveness of transportation infrastructure projects, which are best evaluated
over the long term. But even if, in the worst-case scenario, projects funded by
government-backed financing organizations and infrastructure construction projects
(railroads, highways, and airports) should all fail completely, spill-over returns these
efforts generate may flow into other economic sectors.
Loosening policies
The most important component of any short-term stimulus is the relaxing of the
money supply. So far, interest rates have been lowered twice. But this is far from
enough. Moreover, the reserve deposit ratio is currently too high at 20 %. It should be
17 %, a rate that would have raised the amount of money available for lending at com-
mercial banks to RMB 2500–3000 billion. M2 can also grow at the expected target
rate of 16 %. As for monetary policy, the central bank should amend or abandon the
use of interest rate adjustments or “punitive” (or “differential”) reserve ratio require-
ment hikes which local branches have been required to make in the last 2 years. This
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would free employees up from the monotonous task of monitoring these numbers
from around the country. Instead, local Banking Regulatory Commissions should be
allowed to determine the proper scale of lending for commercial banks by applying
the set of relevant formulas for calculating liquidity, reserve ratio requirement, and
risks devised by the central Banking Regulatory Commission. The central bank should
focus on combating money laundering and managing in-flows and out-flows of for-
eign currencies and payments and receipts for cross-border transactions.
Quantitative easing and lifting of credit caps will provide the necessary conditions
for commercial banks and borrowers to do their part to help the economy grow. It is
still in the interest of the central government to improve tax policies in order to
create internal growth stimuli for economic sectors that produce material outputs.
For instance, the tax burden on small businesses should be reduced, and technology
firms, especially those which create original products, should be exempted from taxes
altogether. This would encourage private investment toward companies and projects
engaged in technological innovation. If we did this, the foundation of China’s indus-
tries will undergo considerable improvement within 5 years. In addition to preferen-
tial tax policies for small businesses and technology companies, corporate tax rates
should be cut for private enterprises of all kinds. The Chinese economy has now
entered a period of cost increases, and profit margins for most companies in non-
banking sectors are generally quite low. Banks, by contrast, have been extraordinarily
profitable. The government should try to rectify this situation with appropriate pol-
icies to channel more financial resources toward non-banking sectors. History has
taught us that if the profitability of the financial sector is substantially higher than
that of any other sectors, especially industrial sectors, the economy will sooner or
later lose momentum. If our tax policies and other stimulus measures are not backed
by sound science, all these years of lip service to structural adjustment and develop-
ment according to a scientific outlook will have been hot air. This time of economic
downturn is the opportune moment for China to give its non-banking sectors a shot
in the arm by making the right changes to the country’s tax structure.
Conclusion
The central bank has been printing too much money for some time now, so much so,
in fact, that it has well nigh become a consensus among those in the know that an
oversupply of money has been the real reason for the 30-year-long “economic miracle.”
Proponents of this view include both laymen who write prolifically and uninhibitedly,
and senior scholars, some of whom are industry veterans, and some of whom have held
key posts in China’s central bank. When the economy began to head south, these same
people were unanimous in opposition to the central bank’s planned adoption of quanti-
tative easing policies and regulatory commission’s planned lifting of restrictions on local
banks to lend to government-backed financing agencies and large projects. To them,
China was repeating the mistake flooding the market with money in order to stimulate
the economy.
I have always held a different belief.
What, after all, is money? It is neither an illusion nor a thin veil but an instrument
for trade. Money is one of the most important elements in a commodity economy.
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Money in circulation, whether originating from the balance sheets of commercial banks
or through foreign reserve purchases by the central bank, represents a certain amount
of commodities and labor activities. Therefore, an economy runs well only when the
money supply is commensurate with the economy’s demand for money. This means
there should be neither a surplus nor a deficiency of money in circulation. Surpluses
are usually indicated by CPI and PPI, while signs of deflation would indicate a defi-
ciency. China’s current M2 growth rate of 13.6 % still falls short by 0.4 percentage point
of the target rate set by the central bank (14 %), and the Chinese economy’s growth is
already slowing. This should leave little room for skepticism about the appropriateness
of quantitative easing policies. The central bank’s historical data show us that 8 per-
centage points higher than GDP would be quite reasonable for M2. Since China’s GDP
growth was 7.8 % for the first 6 months of 2012, the target M2 rate should be 15.8 %.
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